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LAND USE, PLANNING AND ZONING 803
V. First Amendment and Land Use"0
A. Introduction
In the mid-1980s, the focus in this area of the law was on nuisance clo-
sures and license revocation actions affecting adult bookstores and other
kinds of establishments where either obscenity or illicit sexual activities
were taking place. In our last committee report focusing on the first
amendment area" we reported on those areas of the law in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. Since then,
there has been one important Fifth Circuit decision, FW/PBS Inc. v.
City of Dallas,93 that the Supreme Court has agreed to review, with a
decision expected in 1989.
There have been two recent important federal court decisions involv-
ing the zoning of religious institutions and religious uses, and a number
of significant federal and state court decisions applying the Supreme
Court's standards for assessing the constitutionality of sign regulations
established in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego." But, by far the
most important decision in the last year in this area of land-use law was
the Supreme Court's decision in City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub-
lishing Co. ,9' involving regulation of newspaper vending machines on
public property.
B. Regulation of Newsracks
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. is the first Supreme
Court case to address municipal regulation of newsracks. Although the
4-3 decision96 striking down the city's newsrack ordinance addresses
some important issues, it leaves a great deal still to be decided.
Prior to 1983, the Cleveland suburb of Lakewood prohibited the
placement of any privately owned structure on public property. After
the Plain Dealer successfully challenged this prohibition in federal
court, 97 the city adopted an ordinance that allowed newsracks to be lo-
cated on public property in commercial districts, while still banning
90. This section is taken from the report of the First Amendment and Land Use Law
Subcommittee, Professors Alan Weinstein, Touro University Law School, and Edward
H. Ziegler, Jr., University of Denver School of Law, Co-Chairmen.
91. See 19 URe. LAW. 939-47 (1988).
92. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
93. 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989).
94. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
95. - U.S. - , 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988).
96. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case.
97. The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio delayed entering a perma-
nent injunction to give the city time to amend its ordinance.
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them in residential districts. The ordinance gave the mayor the authority
to grant or deny applications for annual newsrack permits. If the mayor
denied an application, he was required to "stat[e] the reasons for such
denial." 98 If the mayor granted an application, the city issued an annual
permit subject to several terms and conditions, including approval of the
newsrack's design by the city's architectural review board; an agree-
ment by the newsrack owner to indemnify the city against any liability
arising from the newsrack, guaranteed by a $100,000 insurance policy;
and such other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable
by the mayor. 99
The Plain Dealer elected to challenge the ordinance on its face rather
than seek a permit. The district court declared the ordinance constitu-
tional in its entirety and entered judgment in the city's favor. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,00 finding that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional for three reasons. First, it gave the mayor
unbounded discretion to grant or deny a permit application and to place
unlimited additional terms and conditions on any permit. Second, be-
cause the ordinance lacked any express standards governing newsrack
design, the architectural review board too had unbounded discretion to
deny applications. Third, the indemnity and insurance requirements vi-
olated the first amendment because no similar requirements were placed
on owners of other structures on public property. Because it found that
these three provisions were not severable, the court held the entire ordi-
nance unconstitutional as applied to newsracks in commercial districts;
however, the court decided that the absolute ban on newsracks in resi-
dential areas was both constitutional and severable.'0 '
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun,and Scalia, first concluded that the Plain Dealer could fa-
cially challenge the ordinance. Brennan argued that where first amend-
ment guarantees are involved, a licensing statute that allegedly gives a
government official unbridled discretion over whether to permit or deny
an expressive activity may be challenged facially by one who is subject
to the law, without the necessity of first applying for and being denied a
permit. This recognizes that such unbridled discretion can constitute a
prior restraint on expression and may result in censorship. The prior
restraint problem was particularly acute under this ordinance, Brennan
98. 108 S. Ct. at 2140.
99. Id.
100. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir.
1986).
101. This portion of the court's decision was not challenged.
FALL 1989
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noted, because it is directed specifically at expressive conduct-the cir-
culation of newspapers-and, because permits must be sought annually,
the licensing authority's permit decisions may be influenced by the
views expressed in the newspapers during the previous year.' 0
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court readily found "those por-
tions of the Lakewood ordinance giving the Mayor unfettered discretion
to deny a permit application and unbounded authority to condition the
permit on any additional terms he deems 'necessary and reasonable,' -10,
to be unconstitutional. The Court then remanded the case to the court of
appeals to decide whether the provisions held unconstitutional could be
severed.'04
The dissenting members of the Court, Justices White, Stevens, and
O'Connor, took strong issue with the majority's allowing the Plain
Dealer to challenge the newsrack ordinance on its face. 10 The critical
difference between the majority and the dissenters was whether the or-
dinance should be viewed as a regulation of newspaper circulation (the
majority's view) or only as a regulation of the placement of newsracks
on public property (the dissenters' view). Further, although the major-
ity opinion declined to rule on whether newsracks could be banned from
public property entirely, the dissenters stated they would not find such a
ban unconstitutional, since it would leave newspaper publishers with
ample alternative channels for newspaper circulation.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's ruling did little to resolve the sig-
nificant issues raised by this case. First, the narrow holding that the La-
kewood newsrack licensing scheme was invalid because it vested unbri-
dled discretion in a government official to grant or deny licenses for
conduct protected by the first amendment is not new or surprising.l°6
Second, the majority's "liberal" ruling on the validity of facial chal-
lenges to newsrack ordinances must be viewed with great caution be-
cause the Court's 4-3 vote could swiftly change, given that the two
members of the Court who did not participate in the decision were the
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy. Finally, the Court failed to reach any
of the novel issues in the case, including whether newsracks could be
102. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. at 2143-50 (1988).
103. Id. at 2152.
104. Id.
105. Justice White's dissenting opinion begins "Today the majority takes an extraor-
dinary doctrine, developed cautiously by this Court over the past fifty years, and applies
it to a circumstance, and in a manner, that is without precedent. Because of this unwar-
ranted expansion of our previous cases, I dissent." Id.
106. Lower federal courts have upheld newsrack ordinances that established neutral
criteria to ensure that permitting decisions are not based on the content or viewpoint of
the newspaper. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Crivaro, 851 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1988).
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totally banned from public property' 7 and whether the licensing fees
and indemnity requirements in the ordinance could pass constitutional
muster.
C. Zoning of Religious Institutions
Until 1983, litigation over zoning of religious institutions seemed con-
fined to state courts;' 8 however, that year, both the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal decided cases involving the conflict between
zoning and religious institutions. As opposed to the state courts, which
normally addressed this conflict by means of a due process analysis, the
federal courts directly confronted the claim that zoning restrictions on
religious institutions violated the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment.
In both Lakewood, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v.
City of Lakewood, '9 and Grosz v. City of Miami Beach," ° the courts up-
held zoning regulations against first amendment challenges, using dif-
ferent variations of a balancing test that weighed the competing interests
of municipal regulation and freedom of religion. In Lakewood, the court
used a two-step inquiry, first evaluating the nature of the religious ob-
servance at stake and then the nature of the burden which the municipal-
ity sought to place on the religious observance. "' The Grosz court em-
107. Several state and federal courts have struck down ordinances that had the effect
of totally prohibiting the placement of newsracks. See, e.g., Chicago Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. City of Wheaton, 697 F. Supp. 1464 (N.D. 111. 1988) (prohibition of
newsracks in residential area unconstitutional).
108. The majority of state courts will strike down zoning regulations that bar reli-
gious institutions from residential areas, relying on a due process analysis which finds
that such restrictions do not advance the public good. In these jurisdictions, restrictions
on the location of religious institutions cannot be justified by such normal zoning con-
cerns as potential traffic hazards, effect on property values, noise and decreased enjoy-
ment of neighboring properties. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of
North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 379 N.Y.2d 283, 342
N.E.2d 534 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976). A minority of state courts allow
municipalities the right to exclude religious institutions from residential areas, so long
as they are not totally excluded from the community. See, e.g., Corporation of Presid-
ing Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949). Recently, however, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the leading voice for the majority position, ruled that its former presumption that
religious uses are always in furtherance of the public welfare may now be rebutted by a
showing that the proposed use would actually have a negative impact on the community.
Cornell University v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 503 N.E.2d 509 (1986).
109. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983).
110. 721 F.2d 729 (llth Cir. 1983).
111. The court found that the only burden on religious observance posed by the ordi-
nance was financial in nature: the congregation could worship as it pleased, it was
merely restricted in the choice of a location for its sanctuary to an area comprising ap-
proximately 10 percent of the city. The court distinguished this minor burden from an
ordinance that forced the congregation to forego religious observance through financial
FALL 1989
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ployed a more sophisticated analysis, considering two threshold tests
before it undertook to balance the competing interests of municipal reg-
ulation and freedom of religion.
The first of the Grosz threshold tests inquires whether the government
seeks to regulate religious beliefs or opinions rather than merely re-
stricting religious conduct. While the government may never regulate
religious beliefs, the first amendment does not absolutely prohibit gov-
ernment regulation of religious conduct. The second test requires that
the challenged ordinance have both a secular purpose and a secular ef-
fect. Government action may not have a sectarian purpose; regulation
based upon disagreement with religious tenets or practices or aimed at
impeding religion is unconstitutional. Similarly, if government action
has the effect of negatively influencing the pursuit of religious activity
or the expression of religious belief it fails to pass constitutional muster.
Only if a government regulation passes both of these threshold tests,
should a court balance the burden on the city's legitimate interests in
maintaining its zoning objectives against the burden on a plaintiff's right
to free exercise of his religion."
2
Subsequent federal court cases have adopted either the Grosz or Lake-
wood analysis, and generally upheld municipal ordinances against first
amendment challenges." 3 In two recent cases, however, federal courts
have struck down zoning ordinances that intruded too deeply on the
right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the first amendment.
or criminal penalties or by placing burdensome taxes on the exercise of religious beliefs.
Since the court found no restriction of the first amendment right to freedom of religion,
it determined that the municipality was free to regulate the location of churches in a
reasonable manner so as to maintain the residential environment of certain districts.
112. In Grosz, an elderly Orthodox Jewish rabbi had converted his home's garage
into a sanctuary for religious worship. Although the city stipulated that it would not
enforce its zoning laws if no more than ten persons gathered for worship in the rabbi's
home, on occasion, as many as fifty congregants attended religious services in the ga-
rage. At least 50 percent of the city's residential zones permitted religious institutions,
including an area four blocks from the rabbi's home. On these facts, the court found that
the ordinance passed both threshold tests and proceeded to balance the burden on the
city's legitimate interest in maintaining its zoning objectives against the burden on the
plaintiffs' right to free exercise of their religion. The court found the city's interest in
maintaining certain wholly residential districts free of the noise and crowds associated
with religious services to be substantial. Although the zoning law imposed some burden
on freedom of religion, since more than half of the city was available for religious insti-
tutions, the regulation was valid.
113. See Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (10th Cir.
1988) (municipality which barred construction of church in agricultural zone either as
"of right" or by special permit found to have acted reasonably); First Assembly of God
v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1984) (zoning ordinance which required a
church to comply with fencing, shrubbery and enrollment restrictions held not to violate
either the first or fourteenth amendments because the public welfare was the motive
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In Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville,114 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Board of Aldermen of the City of
Starkville violated the free exercise clause when it denied a special ex-
ception to a Muslim religious institution. In Love Church v. City of
Evanston,"5 a federal district court held that a zoning ordinance requir-
ing churches to obtain a special permit, in a zone where meeting halls,
theatres, and schools were permitted uses, violated equal protection.6
Islamic Center is the first federal appellate decision to find a munici-
pal zoning activity violative of the free exercise clause. Starkville, home
of Mississippi State University, does not allow churches as a permitted
use near the university campus, but the zoning ordinance provides that
churches may be permitted as a special exception. In fact, there are no
churches in any part of Starkville in which churches are permitted as of
right. The city's twenty-five churches are all located in restricted areas,
nine having obtained special exceptions while the other sixteen occu-
pied their sites before the ordinance became effective.
In 1977, a group of Muslim university students began to search for a
building they could use as a mosque. Because few of the Muslim students
owned cars, they sought a site within walking distance of the campus.
Over the next few years, the students proposed numerous sites to city
planning officials, but were told in each case that the site was unsuitable.
Finally, in 1983, the city planning commission recommended approval of
a site, within two blocks of the campus, next door to an existing residence
and worship center for a Pentecostal Christian denomination. Despite this
recommendation, the Board of Aldermen voted unanimously to deny the
required special exception because of purported concerns about traffic
congestion and neighborhood safety. Ignoring the Board's denial, the stu-
dents proceeded to renovate the property and began to use it as both a
student residence and mosque. Approximately one year later, the city or-
dered the Islamic Center to stop holding worship services. The students
then instituted this litigation.
behind the ordinance and the regulations imposed by the ordinance were reasonable);
Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enforcement of local occupancy and fire safety regulations upheld
because such regulations do not contravene any tenet of religious belief but merely make
the practice of one's religious beliefs more difficult).
114. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988).
115. 671 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
116. See also Jehovah's Witnesses Assembly Halls of New Jersey, Inc. v. City of
Jersey City, 597 F. Supp. 972 (D.N.J. 1984) (preliminarily injunction granted to allow
initial repairs of theater to be used for religious worship where, although zoning ordi-
nance prohibits religious uses in the particular commercial zone involved, use of the
theater for religious worship would not have impacts any different from permitted use as
a commercial theater).
FALL 1989
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The U.S. district court upheld the Board, but was reversed on appeal.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion examined both the Lakewood and Grosz de-
cisions in deciding that the Starkville ordinance, as applied, placed
more than an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion because it
had the effect of forcing the relatively impecunious students to establish
their mosque at sites that were reasonably accessible only by automo-
bile. The court also found that the city did not treat all religious institu-
tions that applied for special exceptions alike and could advance no ra-
tional basis other than neighborhood opposition to show why the
exception granted all other religious centers was denied the Islamic
Center."7 The court concluded that the Board of Aldermen had denied
the Islamic Center a special exception for reasons other than consider-
ations of traffic control and public safety and that it applied different
standards to approving a mosque than it had adopted for Christian insti-
tutions. Moreover, the city failed to show the importance of its purpose
for the denial or that it could be accomplished by means less burden-
some to the Muslim students' exercise of their religious freedom. For
these reasons, the court declared the ordinance unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the Islamic Center and enjoined the city from enforcing the ordi-
nance.
Love Church"8 involved a congregation of about thirty young black
people who meet in public halls and private homes on Sunday to conduct
worship services. Since April 1986, the church had attempted to lease
property for its Sunday services. The Evanston zoning ordinance does
not permit churches as of right in any zoning district, but will allow
them to locate in any residential or business-commercial district after
obtaining a special use permit. The city normally takes four to six
months after application to grant a permit. The church, claiming that no
landlord would agree to a lease contingent on the church's obtaining a
special permit, sought summary judgment against the city on the
grounds that the ordinance violated the first amendment's establishment
and free exercise clauses and the fourteenth amendment's due process
and equal protection clauses.
Ruling on the church's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the church's establishment clause claim failed because
the city's special permit provision had the clearly secular purpose of in-
117. The Fifth Circuit cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985), as support for the proposition that neighbors' negative attitudes or fears,
unsubstantiated by factors properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not a pernis-
sible basis for differentiating between religious institutions.
118. Love Church v. City of Evanston, 671 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. 111. 1987).
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suring that institutional uses were properly zoned; the free exercise
claim failed because the burden this ordinance placed on the church was
only financial;" 9 but, the church's equal protection claim had merit be-
cause the ordinance required all churches to obtain special permits
while other institutional uses were permitted as of right. The court then
directed the city to respond to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
on the equal protection issue.
In deciding the equal protection claim, the court first addressed the
appropriate standard of review. At issue, of course, was whether the
city had based its special exception requirement on the basis of
religion-which would require that the city show a compelling state in-
terest for the classification-or, purely on land-use concerns, requiring
only a rational basis for the distinction. The city claimed that because
numerous other uses faced the same special permit requirement as
churches, the distinction was not based on religion but on purely secular
purposes. 120 The court rejected this claim, arguing that when a law bur-
dens a constitutionally protected interest, it is irrelevant that it also bur-
dens interests and classes that are unprotected. The real test, the court
said, was not which uses the city required to obtain special permits, but
how Evanston treated uses "similarly situated" to churches.
Characterizing churches as primarily "assembly uses," the court
found that secular assembly uses were not subjected to the same treat-
ment as churches and the only distinguishable feature among these vari-
ous assembly uses was the purpose and content of the assembly. The
court concluded that Evanston's ordinance distinguished between reli-
gious assembly uses and secular assembly uses and thus the special per-
mit requirement was a classification based on religion. The court then
held that the city could not meet its burden of showing that the classifica-
tion was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental inter-
est. The court granted the church's motion for summary judgment and
declared the special permit requirement, as applied to churches, uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
D. Regulation of Adult Businesses
Between 1976 and 1986, the Supreme Court handed down three rulings
on the constitutionality of zoning restrictions regulating the location or
operation of sexually oriented "adult" businesses. Beginning with
119. Citing Lakewood and Grosz.
120. Included in the special permit requirement were, among others, nursing and
retirement homes, hospitals, airports, cemeteries, and private clubs and lodges.
FALL 1989
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Young v. American Mini Theatres, 2' and then continuing with Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim122 and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., '123 the Court established that municipalities could single-out adult
businesses for special regulatory treatment in the form of time, place,
and manner regulations that restricted the locations where such busi-
nesses could operate, so long as the municipality could show it had a
substantial governmental interest in regulating such businesses and the
regulations still allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of commun-
ication. 124
In February 1989, the Court signaled its return to the subject of adult
business regulation when it granted review in three consolidated cases
that raise issues new to the Court in the adult business context. In the
ruling below, FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,2 5 a divided Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a district court's finding that the adult busi-
ness zoning and licensing ordinance adopted by Dallas in 1986 was
valid. 126
Two judges found no constitutional problems with the ordinance.
121. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
122. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
123. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
124. For a discussion of these rulings, see Weinstein, The Renton Decision: A New
Standard for Adult Business Regulation, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 91
(1987). The Supreme Court has also addressed adult entertainment regulation outside
the zoning context in cases involving either the application of criminal nuisance statutes
to shutdown adult businesses that were the site of criminal activity or state liquor regula-
tions that restricted the presentation of adult entertainment, normally topless or nude
dancing, in establishments that serve alcoholic beverages. In Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), the Court upheld the application of New York's one year
nuisance closure statute to shut down an adult bookstore that was the site of illicit sexual
activities. For a discussion of this case, see Ziegler, Sexually Oriented Businesses, the
First Amendment, and the Supreme Court's 1985-86 Term: The New Prerogatives of
Local Community Control, 32 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 123, 138-146 (1987).
In a line of cases beginning with California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), the Su-
preme Court has recognized that when adult entertainment takes place in establishments
that serve alcoholic beverages, the added presumption in favor of the validity of state
regulation that the twenty-first amendment (repeal of prohibition) confers requires that
the regulation be upheld so long as it is not an irrational exercise of the police power. See
City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986); New York State Liquor Authority v.
Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
125. 837 F.2d at 1298.
126. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.Tex. 1986). The Dallas
adult business zoning and licensing ordinance includes, among others, the following
provisions: (1) a business must be at least 1,000 feet from another adult business or a
church, school, residential area or park; (2) adult businesses must obtain a license is-
sued by the chief of police and permit inspection of their premises; (3) a license is not
available to persons formerly convicted of specified crimes, such as promotion of pros-
titution; (4) viewing rooms in adult theaters must be configured to allow visual surveil-
lance by management; and (5) rental of a motel room for less than ten hours at a time is
prohibited.
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They viewed the general licensing scheme in the ordinance as regulating
only the secondary effects of adult businesses and found that these pro-
visions met the standards applicable to time, place and manner restric-
tions as announced in Renton. The locational restrictions were also
found to meet the adequate alternative locations test announced in Re-
nton. They found the other constitutional attacks on the ordinance
equally unconvincing.
As a threshold matter, they noted that the Renton standard applied to
the details of the licensing scheme, arguing that the very title of the
"time, place and manner" doctrine suggested that the analysis could
not be limited to locational restrictions (emphasis added). On that basis,
they held that the open viewing booth requirement was a valid regula-
tion of "secondary effects" because the city could reasonably conclude
that closed booths encourage illegal and unsanitary sexual activity and
upheld the ten hour minimum rental period for motel rooms because the
city could reasonably find that short rental periods facilitate prostitu-
tion.
The provision that denies licenses to persons convicted of certain
crimes was more troubling since it did not fit neatly into the previous
Renton-based approach focused on regulating the manner in which an
adult business was conducted and they debated whether a strict scrutiny
standard was required; however, while claiming that the provision
could withstand strict scrutiny, they declined to impose that standard on
the city, ruling that only a substantial relationship need be shown be-
tween the conviction and the evil to be prevented. Since, in their view,
denial of a license results only from offenses that are related to the crim-
inal activity associated with adult businesses, they found the relation-
ship between the offense and the evil to be direct and substantial. Fi-
nally, they found that the ordinance did not give overbroad discretion to
the Chief of Police because the ordinance contained sufficiently objec-
tive standards to bound his exercise of discretion and they upheld the
inspection provisions against first and fourth amendment challenges.
Judge Thornberry concurred with his colleagues that the ordinance's
locational restrictions and regulation of businesses whose activities
were not speech-related, such as adult motels, were valid, but dissented
with respect to regulation of those businesses whose activities directly
implicate the first amendment. He took sharp issue with the argument
that Renton supports the view that time, place, and manner restrictions
can be applied to licensing as well as zoning restrictions on adult busi-
nesses. In his view, licensing schemes raise serious prior restraint prob-
lems because, while zoning restrictions can still leave open alternative
FALL 1989
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avenues of communication, the denial of a license is a complete ban on
speech. He also took exception to the majority's analysis upholding the
provisions denying a license to persons convicted of certain crimes,
contending that strict scrutiny was required and that some of the chosen
licensing provisions could not withstand that scrutiny.
There have been numerous state and lower federal court decisions
over the past three years involving the validity of adult business regula-
tions under the Supreme Court's decision in Renton. A number of these
cases have explored Renton's requirement that there be reasonable al-
ternative locations available for adult businesses. Courts have upheld
ordinances that restricted adult businesses solely to industrially zoned
areas127 or set-aside areas comprising as little as 2.3 percent of the mu-
nicipality's land area for adult businesses.1 2 ' By contrast, other courts
have struck down ordinances that left only 0.23 and 1.4 percent of the
municipal land area available for adult businesses. 29 These decisions
should not be read as imputing a talismanic quality to any given percent-
age as an arbiter of the validity of locational restrictions under Renton;
rather, in each case, the court inquired into the effect the restrictions
would have on existing businesses that would be forced to relocate and
on the availability of additional sites for new adult businesses.
Renton also held that municipalities need not produce their own evi-
dentiary findings on the secondary effects of adult businesses, but could
rely on the findings of other cities. Applying this standard, the Eighth
Circuit upheld an ordinance whose "findings" consisted of the "per-
sonal observations" of a member of the city's governing board who was
familiar with the Young decision,' but the Sixth Circuit struck down an
ordinance where, after a careful review of the record, the court could
find no evidence of either a governmental purpose or findings to justify
imposition of the ordinance. 13'
127. See Cook County v. Renaissance Arcade and Bookstore, 122 fI1. 2d 123, 522
N.E.2d 73 (1988) (the court found that the ordinance established approximately
seventy-eight industrially zoned areas, located throughout the county and ranging in
size from several acres up to 100 acres, in which adult businesses could locate as a mat-
ter of right); Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 532 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dept. 1988), aff'd, 73
N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215 (1989).
128. See S & G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate, 638 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (2.3 percent); Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. at 1061, aff'd sub nom.,
FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988) (8 to 10 percent).
129. See Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988)
(1.4 percent); Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987) (0.23 per-
cent).
130. See Thames Enterprises, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1988)
(court found that the personal observations and judgment of a legislator can have sub-
stantial weight).
131. See Christy, 824 F.2d at 489.
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Finally, in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 3 2 the court struck
down an ordinance that was applied to make a theater an adult-oriented
business on the basis of a single showing of an adult motion picture. The
court found that the municipality could not demonstrate how a single
showing of an adult movie would have any harmful secondary effect on
the community.
E. Local Regulation of Signs and Billboards
Though the messages on signs or billboards, whether commercial or
noncommercial in content, are forms of speech protected by the first
amendment, the Supreme Court generally has sanctioned local regula-
tion of these land uses. Standards for assessing the constitutionality of
sign restrictions are set out in the Supreme Court's opinions in Metro-
media, Inc. v. City of San Diego33 and Members of City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent.' 3" Content-neutral, and reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions are permissible. For regulation to be valid it must
directly further a sufficiently substantial governmental objective unre-
lated to the suppression of speech and be no more restrictive than neces-
sary to achieve the governmental objective. In applying this balancing
test, a court also may consider whether the impact of the regulation
leaves open ample alternative channels of communication for the ex-
pression. Generally, courts in recent years in applying these standards
for validity have upheld a variety of types of local regulation of signs
and billboards, including total bans on off-site commercial signs, based
on the governmental objectives of traffic safety and aesthetics.'3
However, under the standards in Metromedia, an ordinance is invalid
if it imposes greater restrictions on noncommercial (political or ideo-
logical) signs than on commercial signs or regulates noncommercial
signs based on their content. These standards for validity have been ap-
plied in a number of recent court decisions holding sign restrictions un-
constitutional. Ordinances granting commercial signs more favorable
treatment than noncommercial signs, such as allowing only on-site
commercial signs, continue to be struck down. 36 Similarly, content-
based ordinances, allowing some but not other noncommercial signs,
132. 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
134. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
135. See Ziegler, Local Control of Signs and Billboards: An Analysis of Recent Reg-
ulatory Efforts, 8 ZONING & PLAN. L. REp. 161 (1985).
136. E.g., Tauber v. Town of Longmeadow, 695 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Mass. 1988);
Town of Carmel v. Suburban Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 387
(1987).
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continue to be struck down since the first amendment clearly forbids the
selective prohibition of protected noncommercial speech based on its
content. 
137
The invalidity of sign ordinances that require an examination of the
content of noncommercial messages along with the practical benefits in
effective enforcement suggest both legal and practical reasons for utili-
zation of truly content-neutral sign regulations, including the absence of
a distinction between commercial and noncommercial signs. 13 Al-
though the issue is not clearly settled, recent court decisions have up-
held the constitutionality of ordinances that require that both noncom-
mercial and commercial messages on signs in certain districts relate to
on-site activities where other political signs are allowed in a commu-
nity. These cases in effect sanction truly content-neutral restrictions for
on-premises signs in certain districts where adequate alternative meth-
ods of communication are left open within a community. 1
39
Also, in a recent case involving a local regulation affecting commer-
cial speech that was not content-neutral, the Washington Court of Ap-
peals upheld a prohibition on "sexually explicit" outdoor advertising as
applied to an adult theater finding that the restriction would serve the
governmental objective of mitigating the negative impact of the location
of the adult theater on the surrounding area.40
Under the standards in Metromedia, recent court decisions have up-
held the constitutionality of regulations banning all off-site commercial
signs, banning all off-site billboards in certain areas, and prohibiting the
construction of any new off-premises outdoor advertising structure. 14'
However, in the recent case, Bell v. Township of Stafford, 42 the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held unconstitutional a local ordinance to-
tally prohibiting all off-premises advertising signs, including noncom-
mercial signs, within the municipality. Following earlier decisions, the
court held that a total municipal-wide ban on all off-premises signs dras-
137. E.g., National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.
1988); Adams Outdoor Advertising v. Newport News, 236 Va. 370, 373 S.E.2d 917
(1988).
138. See Kelly & Raso, The Case for Content-Neutral Sign Regulations, 40 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1988).
139. See Rzadkowolski v. Village of Lake Orion, 845 F.2d 653, 655 (6th Cir. 1988);
Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 1987). But see
National Advertising Co., 861 F.2d at 246 (suggesting that limiting noncommercial
signs in certain areas to on-premises activities would be unconstitutional).
140. City of Pasco v. Rhine, 51 Wash. App. 354, 753 P.2d 993 (1988).
141. See Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 844 F.2d at 174; Georgia Outdoor Ad-
vertising, 873 F.2d at 43; Burns v. Barrett, 41 Conn. Supp. 66, 550 A.2d 23 (Conn.
Super. 1988).
142. 110 N.J. 384, 541 A.2d 692 (1988).
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tically encroached on freedom of speech and expression and that a city's
burden in justifying such a ban was particularly strenuous. The New
Jersey court found that the city had not shown that the total ban was the
least restrictive means available to promote traffic safety and aesthetics
and that, in any case, there was no adequate showing by the city that
alternative means of communication of noncommercial messages were
left open by the ordinance.
Since the Metromedia decision, regulation banning portable signs but
allowing permanent or free-standing signs in the same area has in some
cases been upheld by courts. 14' However, other courts have found no
reasonable basis for such a distinction based on aesthetics or traffic
safety, where free-standing permanent signs are allowed. 144 Two recent
federal court decisions have upheld total bans on portable signs display-
ing commercial or noncommercial messages. 4 5 Both courts held that
great deference should be shown to a local governmental body's deci-
sion that such a ban would further the city's interest in curing aesthetic
blight.
Recent court decisions also have dealt with the "taking" issue where
ordinances require the amortization of nonconforming signs. While
earlier cases have held that this issue requires an ad hoc factual inquiry
into the economic impact of regulation on a plaintiff, a recent case,
Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,'4 discusses in some detail specific
factors to be considered at an evidentiary hearing held to resolve this
complex issue. Generally, this decision strongly favors the constitution-
ality of amortization provisions.
14 7
VI. Federal Land-Use Policy Developments'"
Nineteen eighty-eight was especially a year of transition in the field of
federal policies and programs affecting land use. A number of signifi-
cant bills were introduced but not enacted. Yet the course of their con-
sideration portends that many if not all of them will be enacted in some
143. See, e.g., Rent-A-Sign v. City of Rockford, 85 Ill. App. 3d 453, 406 N.E. 2d
943 (1980).
144. See, e.g., Dills v. Cobb County, 593 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
145. Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 707 (1988); Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051 (11
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
146. 844 F.2d at 176.
147. For a recent court decision finding an unconstitutional "taking" of property as
a result of a four-year sign amortization period based on the economic impact of the
regulation, see Georgia Outdoor Advertising, 690 F. Supp. at 452.
148. This section is based upon the annual report of the Federal Land Use Policy
Subcommittee, Michael Mantell, Chairman.
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